Abstract. Cryptosystems based on the knapsack problem were among the rst public key systems to be invented and for a while were considered quite promising. Basically all knapsack cryptosystems that have been proposed so far have been broken, mainly by means of lattice reduction techniques. However, a few knapsack-like cryptosystems have withstood cryptanalysis, among which the Chor-Rivest scheme 2] even if this is debatable (see 16]), and the Qu-Vanstone scheme proposed at the Dagstuhl'93 workshop 13] and published in 14]. The Qu-Vanstone scheme is a public key scheme based on group factorizations in the additive group of integers modulo n that generalizes Merkle-Hellman cryptosystems. In this paper, we present a novel use of lattice reduction, which is of independent interest, exploiting in a systematic manner the notion of an orthogonal lattice. Using the new technique, we successfully attack the Qu-Vanstone cryptosystem. Namely, we show how to recover the private key from the public key. The attack is based on a careful study of the so-called Merkle-Hellman transformation.
Introduction
The knapsack problem is as follows : given a set fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g of positive integers and a sum s = P n i=1 x i a i , where each x i 2 f0; 1g, recover the x i . It is well known that this problem is NP-complete, and accordingly it is considered to be quite hard in the worst case. However some knapsacks are very easy to solve : if the set S = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g of positive integers is a superincreasing sequence, e.g. The Public Key: a set of positive integers fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g. The Private Key: a method to transform the presumed hard public knapsack into an easy knapsack.
The Message Space: all 0 ? 1 vectors of length n.
Encryption: a message M = (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) is enciphered into C = P n i=1 x i a i :
In 1978, Merkle and Hellman 10] devised a method to convert superincreasing sequences into what they believed were hard knapsacks. If S = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g is a superincreasing sequence and a = P n i=1 a i , select two coprime integers m and w such that m > a. The with P n i=1 x i a i a < m, we have f ?1 (c) = P n i=1 x i a i . By solving the easy knapsack S = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g, one recovers the x i . Applying a sequence of MerkleHellman transformations is not equivalent to a single application, and hence, should enhance the security of the system. Unfortunately, these systems were both shown to be insecure (see 17, 1] ). Despite the failure of Merkle-Hellman cryptosystems, researchers continued to search for knapsack-like cryptosystems because such systems are very easy to implement and can attain very high encryption/decryption rates. But most of the proposed knapsack-like cryptosystems have been broken (for a survey, see 12]), either by speci c attacks or by the so-called low-density attacks.
The density of a knapsack S = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n g is de ned to be d = n N where N = max 1 i n log 2 a i . When the density is small (namely, less than 0:94:::), one can prove the knapsack problem can be solved using lattice reduction with high probability (see 4]). Such attacks are called low-density attacks. The attack has recently been improved by 16], but is still une ective against high-density knapsacks. The few knapsack cryptosystems that have so far withstood all attacks use knapsacks of high density. In 13], Qu and Vanstone showed that Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystems could be viewed as special cases of knapsack-like cryptosystems arising from subset factorizations in nite groups. They proposed a generalization of these knapsack cryptosystems by constructing a supposedly hard factorization of nite group, using Merkle-Hellman-like transformations and superincreasing sequences. This hard factorization problem can be restated as a knapsack problem of density higher than 3. We will attack the Qu-Vanstone system by showing how to recover the hidden easy factorization (the private key) from the presumed hard factorization (the public key), in a reasonable time.
2 The orthogonal lattice
We will use the word lattice for any integer lattice, that is any additive subgroup of Z n . Background on lattices can be found in 5, 3] . We denote vectors by boldface lowercase letters. Let be a lattice in Z n .
Let b 1 ; : : : ; b d be vectors of . These d vectors form a basis of if they are linearly independent over Z, and if any element of can be expressed as a linear combination of the b i 's with integral coe cients. There exists at least one basis of . The bases of all have the same cardinality, called the dimension of . We say that is a sublattice of a lattice in Z n if contains and if both have the same dimension. All bases of span the same Q-vector subspace of Q n , which we denote by E . The dimension of E over Q is equal to the dimension of . De ne the lattice = E \ Z n . is a sublattice of . We say that is a complete lattice if = . In particular, is a complete lattice.
Let (x; y) 7 ! x:y be the usual euclidian inner product, and k:k be its corresponding norm. Let Theorem 1. Let be a complete lattice in Z n . Then det( ? ) = det( ). Proof. We have = E \ Z n and ? = E ? \ Z n . We know from 9] that :
; where (Z n ) denotes the polar lattice of Z n . But det(Z n ) = 1 and (Z n ) = Z n , therefore det( ? ) = det( ).
Corollary 2. Let be a lattice in Z n . Then det(( ? ) ? ) = det( ? ) = det( ).
In 1982, Lenstra, Lenstra and Lov asz introduced the famous LLL-algorithm 8], a polynomial time algorithm that computes a so-called LLL-reduced basis of any given lattice. For de nitions and proofs regarding LLL-reduced bases, we refer to 8, 3] . In this paper, we only need the following properties of LLL-reduced bases : 4 Theorem 3. Let (b 1 ; : : : ; b d ) be an LLL-reduced basis of a lattice in Z n . Then : We One can prove that this is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm with respect to the space dimension n, the lattice dimension d and any upper bound of the bit-length of the kb j k's. In practice, one does not need to select such a large constant c because the theoretical bounds of the LLL algorithm (theorem 3) are quite pessimistic. We will use this algorithm throughout the attack. The message space is Z 16 s , and the numbers in each D i are roughly around s k n. Qu This public key system has features similar to the original knapsack scheme. The security rests on the Merkle-Hellman-like transformations that hide the 4 superincreasing sequences and the coset structure. The knapsack based on the blocks D i has density higher than 3, so it looks immune to the usual low-density attacks. Qu and Vanstone discuss several attacks on this system in their paper 13]. We now describe our attack which mainly consists of two steps : we rst attack Merkle-Hellman-like transformations by reducing several orthogonal lattices, then we compute successive orthogonal lattices to reveal the secret key. The rst step is quite general but the second step is based on the particular structure of the hidden subset factorization. We advise to read the further description of the Qu-Vanstone scheme given in appendix in order to fully understand the second step. ); 1 e k (2) Note that in equation (2), we mean component-wise operations and that we only assume congruences, not necessarily equalitities. Under these hypotheses (1) and (2), we will see that c
and c (k) almost share the same orthogonal lattice.
Heuristic 6. Let be the lattice spanned by c (k) . . Iterating this process, we nd that x is orthogonal to c (k?2)
; : : : ; c
. This means that if x 2 ? is short enough, then x is orthogonal to c
. Now we will see that there exist N ? k ? 1 independent vectors of ? that are short, and hopefully short enough. From the description of the scheme, we know that m s 32, therefore heuristic 6 is likely to be satis ed. Hence, applying algorithm 5 twice, we can construct k+1 vectors e 1 ; : : : ; e k+1 of Z N such that there exist 1 ; : : : ; k+1 2 Z satisfying c
= 1 e 1 + 2 e 2 + + k+1 e k1 :
In the second step of the attack, we determine these unknown integers j . The knowledge of c (0) then reveals the trapdoor and the rest of the secret key : this is sketched in the appendix because it is based on the structure of the subset factorization. We emphasize that the di cult part of the attack is to determine c (0) , not to obtain the secret key from c (0) which is rather easy.
Breaking the kernel of the system
We say that C i = fc i; j] : 0 j 15g is a weak block if f(i) is of form (4; i 0 ).
For the de nition of f, we refer to the description of the scheme in appendix. Clearly, half of the s blocks C i are weak blocks. We call these blocks weak due to the following : Lemma 10. Let C i = fc i; j] : 0 j 15g be a weak block. . But we can easily check whether this is a consistent c
, because c
reveals the trapdoor corresponding to the subset factorization (see the appendix). Hence, the exhaustive search is really feasible and provides the secret key. Now if we do not know the permutations i 's and the bijection f, we construct the linear transformation by choosing randomly 2 distinct integers i 1 , i 2 between 1 and s : for each of these 2 integers, we select randomly 3 distinct j 1 , j 2 , j 3 between 1 and 15 such that j 1 < j 2 . The probability that both i 1 and i 2 correspond to weak blocks is 1=4. For each of these 2 integers, we have to test at most 15 14 13 2 = 1365 triplets (j 1 ; j 2 ; j 3 ) to nd one that satis es lemma 10.
This means that we have to check at most 4 1365 2 = 7452900 choices of . But such a check can be done very quickly : if is correct, then has a very small vector (at least as short as (c (0) ) d1d2d3d4 ), and otherwise, there is no reason that such a situation happens. Since computing can be done in less than a second (involved lattices have very small dimension), we can check all choices of in a reasonable time (namely, less than one week with 10 workstations). Once a suitable has been found, we perform an exhaustive search on (c (0) ) d1d2d3d4 as before. If one wants to improve success probabilities, one can increase the number of components of by adding new integers i, once a suitable with two components has been found. Each additional integer i costs at most 1365 tests and we can determine them successively, therefore we can easily determine the s=2 weak blocks, which reveals f. Then we apply the previous strategy in order to obtain the rest of the secret key.
Experiments
The attack has been successfully implemented using blockwise Korkine-Zolotarev lattice reductions 15] instead of LLL reductions to improve the reduced basis for heuristic 6. We used the package previously developped by A. Joux 6] in our lab. Timings are given for a 50Mhz Sparc 4, with parameters s = 32 and k = 3. It takes about 9 hours to obtain the k + 1-dimensional lattice from the 32 blocks of 16 integers that form the public key. In our implementation, we assumed that the permutations i 's and the bijection f were known, which gave the secret key almost immediately : both the computation of and the exhaustive search of (c (0) ) d1d2d3d4 are performed in a few minutes. In practice, the vector (c (0) ) d1d2d3d4 happens to be a very small linear combination of the LLL-reduced basis vectors (coe cients less than 10 in absolute value). In the case where we do not know the permutations i 's and the bijection f, initial experiments con rm the above discussion.
Conclusion
We introduced the basic notion of an orthogonal lattice. This concept rst leads to an e cient attack against both Merkle-Hellman and Merkle-Hellman-like transformations. This attack di ers from Shamir's and Brickell's attacks against original Merkle-Hellman cryptosystems. It points out that one should be cautious with the cryptographic use of Merkle-Hellman transformations. The notion of an orthogonal lattice also enables us to exploit weaknesses in the subset factorization (the trapdoor). These two applications of lattice reduction form an attack against the Qu-Vanstone scheme that works for any choice of the parameters. The attack has been successfully implemented and reveals the secret key from the public key in a reasonable time.
A Appendix
In this appendix, we describe the subset factorization used in the Qu-Vanstone scheme and we provide the missing proofs of sections 2 and 3.
A.1 Further description of the Qu-Vanstone scheme Construction of the s blocks C i Recall that n is a positive integer of the form n = d 1 Step 3. Compute S 3 = q ?1
